Week 3: "Does the Winner Deserve to Take All?: The Accuracy of Plurality"and Instant Runoff

On Tuesday, I turned in my first paper of the course: "Does the Winner Deserve to Take All?: The Accuracy of Plurality." In this article, I argued that voters should be more aware of the various alternative voting methods to the current plurality electoral system that is widely used around the world. This way, they will be able to both derive their own opinions about whether or not they agree with the accuracy of plurality and have informed discussions about its fairness. Here is the link to my paper if you are interested in reading it: https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vTeG_ttFo1l4m6CDgMrJLznk6ur0SbVJ-5u0sR5RgPFSj0MrGT01EjzaLWhEtPBRhBLDmYgYIyLDJeo/pub. I will be editing it throughout the term, and hopefully it will be published in the STEM journal on campus in the spring!

I then proceeded to research the instant runoff method, also referred to as the Hare method and "ranked choice voting." Each voter provides a preference list, which must include every candidate and no ties are allowed, at the election. The totals are calculated, and the candidate with the FEWEST NUMBER OF FIRST PLACE VOTES is eliminated. The votes are recalculated as if the eliminated candidate hadn't existed, and once again the person with the least number of first place votes is removed from the competition. This process continues until two candidates are left and the winner is the person with the majority of first place votes wins.

In conjunction with the Hare method, I also looked at the Coombs rule, which is essentially the opposite of instant runoff: the candidates with the GREATEST NUMBER OF LAST PLACE VOTES are eliminated one at a time. Two main questions I had when comparing these methods were: would they produce different outcomes and which is more fair? It turns out that, yes, the Hare method and Coombs rule can result in different winners. Take this very simple preference profile for a hypothetical election, for example:

Favorite to least favorite

5 voters: A, C, B

4 voters: B, C, A

3 voters: C, B, A

If the Hare method was used, Candidate C would be eliminated first, then Candidate A, and Candidate B would win. If Coombs rule was applied, Candidate A would be eliminated first, then Candidate B, and Candidate C would win. (Side note: if plurality was used, A would win: three different candidates would win with three different electoral systems!)

This weekend, I will be creating a hypothetical scenario like the one above and ask faculty members and my peers at school which method, Coombs or Hare, they perceive as the most fair.

There are so many other exciting things coming up in this project, so stay tuned for more in next week's updates!